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A book review on
Wish-fulfillment in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: The Tyranny of Desire
Wish-fulfillment is a psychoanalytic con-
cept that applies to situations in which
some agent with a frustrated desire rep-
resents the world as he would like it to
be—rather than as it actually is—and in
this manner pacifies the desire. This sub-
stitution by the agent of his phantasy for a
veridical view of what is going on with him
and the external world has been thought
by psychodynamic theorists since Freud
to explain a wide range of phenomena:
the content of dreams, psychiatric delu-
sion, religious practices, and so on. In this
book Tamas Pataki gives a theory of wish-
fulfillment which is meant to unify and
explain a range of phenomena that does
justice to the original explanatory scope of
the concept, from neurosis and delusion to
art and religion. Pataki’s book shows up
against the background of a tradition in
analytic philosophy that is generally sym-
pathetic to psychoanalytic ways of think-
ing about mindedness, and which deploys
its resources in order to (i) better under-
stand the patterns of explanation that are
given in clinical practice, and the concepts
that those explanations employ; and (ii)
outline the necessary conditions on any
such explanation—to determine what the
mindmust be like, if psychoanalytic expla-
nation is cogent. One discovery that issues
from this kind of analysis is that psycho-
analysis constitutes an extension of ordi-
nary psychological explanation. This was
first comprehensively argued by Wollheim
(1971) and his colleague Hopkins (1982),
with later extension and qualifications of
that argument by Gardner (1993) and
Lacewing (2012).
Pataki’s own treatment is remarkable
in that it espouses the radical extension
of agency (what he calls “intentionalism”)
where past treatments—like the Bayesian
story in Hopkins (2012)—have largely
attempted to cash out psychoanalytic con-
cepts in deflated (or “sub-intentional”)
terms; and lately even in terms that inter-
face with the sub-personal theories of cog-
nitive science. Pataki is not unaware of
the conceptual issues with positing uncon-
scious centers of agency, and gives a closely
argued defense of his thesis that the inten-
tional idiom can be applied all the way
down. One impressive thing about this
book is the way that the author always
has an eye on criticisms that might come
frommainstream philosophy of cognition;
that is not always something that is present
in these kinds of discussions. Thus, we
get a digression in the fourth chapter on
the empirical plausibility of unconscious
attention and unconscious intention, in
which Pataki discusses recent work in the
clinical neuropsychology of anosognosia
for hemiplegia.
There is in fact an interesting ambiva-
lence toward the neurological explana-
tion of psychopathology that runs its way
through the book. Pataki has no problem
in showing us that he is well across the rel-
evant literature, particularly that in which
psychodynamic theory is applied in a neu-
roscientific context. He even cites much of
this work approvingly. But he is skeptical
about the reach of neuroscience when it
comes to mental illness. More specifically,
he claims that a neurological account of
some mental illness cannot constitute a
sufficient account of that illness; that is
to say that he endorses the indispensabil-
ity of the Intentional idiom. The grounds
for this skepticism lie in a view about
mental states according to which the facts
on which their contents supervene exceed
facts about the brain; and more specif-
ically, that they supervene also on the
causal histories and objects of those states.
Thus, the Intentional vocabulary of men-
tal states has autonomy from the vocab-
ulary of neural states, and Pataki thinks
that this licenses him in making a hard-
and-fast distinction between neurological
disorders (like Parkinson’s) and mental
disorders (like schizophrenia). In the lat-
ter cases, Pataki maintains, a full account
of any particular disorder requires a spec-
ification in terms of what the symptoms
mean for the patient.
Pataki’s positive thesis is that wish-
fulfillment necessitates the agent creating
evidence for himself in order to elicit a par-
ticular false belief, and that this evidence-
creation is performed intentionally, albeit
unconsciously. Pataki gives the compelling
example of the exhibitionist who exposes
himself to women in order to garner the
evidence that his genitals are impressive
and important. The shock and outrage
of his victims constitutes the evidence for
this wished-for state of affairs, and enables
the exhibitionist to believe that it is true.
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But how is this performed without falling
into Sartrean paradox? Pataki claims that
the right analysis of this intentional wish-
fulfillment will show that wish-fulfillment
involves the agent becoming engrossed
in playing the role of various person-
ations which have distinct constellations
of beliefs and desires, and that are acti-
vated by the agent in response to certain
triggers or anxieties. This activation of per-
sonations, which are often derived from
representations of first caregivers, consti-
tutes a kind of self-caring that proceeds
through the gratification of the agent’s
frustrated wishes.
I feel that there is a possible equiv-
ocation in the book between a weak
view on which the Intentional idiom is
indispensable in the explanation of men-
tal illness, and on a strong view on which
it is sometimes sufficient. I also think
it may be that the general mechanisms
of mental illnesses are best specified in
the language of cognitive neuroscience,
and that this specification will not require
any Intentional supplement. That may
not be incompatible with the thesis that
some illness-tokens are interpretable in
terms of wish-fulfillment, but it may cause
problems for the view that illnesses like
schizophrenia will always come under a
psychoanalytic description.
These concerns aside, some of the rich-
est material in the book comes when Pataki
is demonstrating the explanatory payoffs
of his theory of wish-fulfillment. Indeed,
one of the benefits of Pataki’s account
is that it can illuminate a much wider
range of phenomena than is possible if
wish-fulfillment is deflated to be a purely
causal phenomenon. In the second half
of the book Pataki goes on to apply his
theory to delusion and self-deception, the
psychological origins of religious belief,
creative writing, and the insanity defense
in jurisprudence. Indeed, it may be that the
light that Pataki’s theory is able to cast on
a wide range of psychological and cultural
phenomena leads the reader to bite the
bullet and accept that agency goes much
deeper than we have traditionally thought
to be the case. In any case, this is a deep
and interesting book, and although it is
in some ways unfashionable in the con-
text of the contemporary literature it is
nonetheless quite compelling in the way
it presents the case for the centrality of
wish-fulfillment in human mindedness.
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